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Cross-Tested Defined Contribution Plans: A
Response to Professor Zelinsky
PETER ORSZAGt AND NORMAN STEINtt
Section 401(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code denies
favorable tax treatment to pension and profit-sharing plans
whose contributions or benefits discriminate in favor of
highly compensated employees. The traditional approach to
testing a defined contribution plan for such discrimination
is to compare the contributions allocated to the accounts of
rank-and-file employees to those allocated to the accounts of
highly compensated employees. Under this approach, a plan
impermissibly favors highly compensated employees if such
employees receive, as a percentage of pay, greater
contributions than rank-and-file employees.' For example,
an employer who contributed 15% of the pay of highly
compensated employees would also have to contribute at
least 15% of the pay of non-highly compensated employees.
In the early 1990s, the Department of Treasury
promulgated regulations that endorsed a different means of
testing defined contribution plans for discrimination.!
Instead of testing such plans for discrimination on a
contributions basis, the regulations endorsed testing on a
benefits basis, a method at one time extended to defined
contribution plans in only a limited number of situations.'
Testing a defined contribution plan on a benefits basis
requires conversion of each annual contribution into a
single life annuity commencing when the employee attains
t Senior Fellow in Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution.
't Douglas Arant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama.
1. In practice, however, firms have the ability to provide substantially
higher contribution rates for higher-paid employees, even apart from cross-
testing of defined contribution plans. We discuss some of the tools firms can use
to effect such discrimination infra Part I.B.
2. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8 (as amended in 1993).
3. See Rev. Rul. 70-580, 1970-2 C.B. 90. See infra text accompanying notes
47-50.
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age sixty-five.4 The resulting annuity benefits for highly
compensated and rank-and-file employees are then
compared as a percentage of current pay. Because the
power of compound interest operates between the year of
contribution and the year the employee attains age sixty-
five, the younger the employee the smaller the amount of
firm contribution to the plan needed to produce a dollar
annuity at age sixty-five. Thus, cross-testing permits a firm
to make a much larger contribution for an older employee
than for a younger employee.5
Cross-testing therefore offers firms a method for
making larger contributions for highly paid employees, so
long as they are older than other employees participating in
a plan.6 Some firms have undertaken variations of cross-
tested plans that exploit certain technical rules relating to
plan participation and nondiscrimination testing in order
to: (i) increase dramatically the amount of disparity
between older and younger employees; (ii) deprive older
rank-and-file employees the larger benefits that cross-
testing permits for older highly compensated employees;
and (iii) provide significant benefits for younger highly
compensated employees despite the use of cross-testing to
limit benefits for other young employees. These second-
generation cross-tested arrangements combine numerous
benefit formulas, use aggressive testing methodologies, and
require complex calculations unlikely to be understood by
4. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b).
5. We discuss this methodology, with examples, in more detail infra Part
I.C.
6. Shortly after firms began exploiting the regulations' endorsement of
cross-testing, the Clinton Administration asked Congress to outlaw the practice.
Industry lobbyists succeeded in removing cross-testing limitations from the
legislation ultimately enacted. See, e.g., GATT Passage Gives Go-Ahead to Long-
Sought Pension Reforms, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2259 (Dec. 5, 1994);
Actuaries to Continue Federal Pension Audits, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2014
(Oct. 24, 1994); Pension Reforms in Trade Bill Represent Employer Victory, Aide
Says, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1847 (Oct. 3, 1994); Administration Pension
Reform Bill Clears Education and Labor Committee, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep.
(BNA) 1563 (Aug. 15, 1994); Archer Calls for Government Scrutiny of Every
Increase in Pension Benefits, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 814 (Apr. 25, 1994);
PBGC Bill Likely to Move Forward, April Hearings Planned, 21 Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA) 645 (Mar. 28, 1994); Administration's Reform Package Introduced
by Reps. Ford, Rostenkowski, 20 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2297 (Nov. 1, 1993);
Several Pension Related Issues Left on This Year's Legislative Agenda, 20 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1965 (Sept. 20, 1993).
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either firm managers or employees. They are often referred
to as "new comparability" plans.
The Department of Treasury has recently proposed to
restrict the use of certain second-generation cross-tested
plans.7 In particular, the proposed regulations would in
some cases require higher minimum contributions for rank-
and-file workers than would otherwise be the case.'
Edward Zelinsky argues that the proposed Treasury
regulations are a misguided intermediate step to control
cross-testing.9 Professor Zelinsky believes that cross testing
should be universally permitted as a matter of policy, and
that cross-testing and the proposed regulations highlight
fundamental flaws and inconsistencies in the
nondiscrimination rules more generally. As a result,
Professor Zelinsky would either eliminate the
nondiscrimination rules altogether or substitute a simpler
nondiscrimination principle based on universal minimum
contributions for all employees. This paper offers a response
to Professor Zelinsky.10
We agree with Professor Zelinsky that the proposed
regulations constitute an awkward intermediate step
between accepting and rejecting cross-testing. But unlike
Professor Zelinsky, we respond to such awkwardness by
concluding that cross-testing should be generally, if not
universally, prohibited. From our perspective, the
regulations are a beneficial, albeit limited, first step on the
road to eliminating most cross-testing. Moreover, we make
7. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b), 65 Fed. Reg. 59,777 (Oct. 6, 2000);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-(a)(4)-9(b)(2)(v), 65 Fed. Reg. 59,779 (Oct. 6, 2000); see
also IRS Notice 2000-14, 2000-1 CB 737 (seeking public comments for IRS and
Treasury review of new comparability plans).
8. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(4), 65 Fed. Reg. 59,777; Prop.
Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)(4)-9(b)(2)(v)(d), 65 Fed. Reg. 59,779.
9. Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing A Mistake? Cash Balance Plans,
New Comparability Formulas, and the Incoherence of the Nondiscrimination
Norm, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 575 (2001) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing A
Mistake?].
10. We do not respond to Professor Zelinsky's comments on cash balance
plans, a type of plan which he believes is impermissible as a matter of law, but
supportable as a matter of tax and retirement policy. See Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAx REV. 683, 684 (2000) [hereinafter
Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy]. One of us has written on the subject
of cash balance plans and suggested that conversions of existing defined benefit
plans to cash-balance plans are problematic because of their effect on the
expectations of long-tenured older employees. See Norman Stein, Some Serious
Questions About Cash Balance Plans, CONTINGENCIES, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 28.
2001]
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an additional argument: that defined benefit plans, which
historically have been tested on a benefits rather than
contribution basis," be limited to situations in which the
firm is not using the plan principally to direct benefits to
older highly compensated employees."
We also find ourselves in agreement with Professor
Zelinsky that the current nondiscrimination rules poorly
bear the weight of the rules' complexity and the ability of
sophisticated pension planners to exploit that complexity to
tilt the benefits of plans to the advantage of favored highly
paid employees. We would thus agree with Professor
Zelinsky that it may be desirable to replace the current
nondiscrimination rules with a simpler and more effective
regulatory approach.
The first section of the paper provides background on
the cross-testing rules. The second section summarizes
Professor Zelinsky's argument. The third section analyzes
and critiques that argument. The fourth section considers
cross-testing in the context of legislation that would (i)
increase qualified plan contribution and benefit limits, and
(ii) relax nondiscrimination principles." The fifth section
examines the recently proposed Treasury regulations.'4 We
conclude by discussing a broader set of reforms to the
nondiscrimination rules.
11. This is, of course, the "natural" means of nondiscrimination testing for a
plan that provides participants with retirement annuities under a plan formula
rather than a benefit equal to an account balance.
12. Cf Norman Stein, Some Policy Implications of the IRS' Small Defined
Benefit Plan Audit Program, 55 TAx NOTES 1407, 1410-11 (1992) (arguing that
the Internal Revenue Code should not extend qualified tax status to most
defined benefit plans of small firms, since such plans are generally regarded by
the firm's owners as the equivalent of defined contribution plans). For a
thought-provoking discussion of when benefits testing may be appropriate in a
world of hybrid plans, see Daniel Halperin & Marla Schnall, Regulating Tax
Qualified Pension Plans in a Hybrid World, 58 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N, at 5-1
(2000).
13. [Editor's Note: A version of the legislation discussed infra Part IV was
enacted by Congress as part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16 (2001), in June 2001, after this
article went into production.]
14. [Editor's Note: The Proposed Regulations discussed infra Part V have
been adopted with modifications. See 66 Fed. Reg. 34,535 (June 29, 2001).]
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I. BACKGROUND ON CROSS-TESTING AND THE
NONDISCRIMINATION NORM
In this section, we review briefly the history, theory and
operation of the nondiscrimination rules generally, and
cross-testing in particular.
A. Historical Overview
Prior to 1942, the Internal Revenue Code required only
that pension plans benefit all or some employees of a firm. 
5
Some firms accordingly adopted plans whose coverage was
limited to a small number of shareholders and highly paid
managers. 6 The Department of Treasury regarded these
plans as little more than tax shelters serving no social
purpose and proposed a variety of requirements for
employee deferred compensation plans, including
nondiscrimination rules. In 1942, Congress responded to
Treasury's concerns by enacting two related sets of
nondiscrimination rules: minimum coverage rules,
requiring plans to cover at least some rank-and-file
workers, and benefit and contribution nondiscrimination
rules, requiring that covered rank-and-file employees
receive either benefits or contributions comparable, as a
percentage of pay, to the benefits or contributions of
officers, shareholders and other highly compensated
employees.
There are three ways of viewing the Treasury proposals
and Congress's intent in adopting them: first, as a means of
curtailing the use of pension plans as tax shelters covering
only key employees (Treasury wanted to limit the tax abuse
it found inherent in an employee retirement plan covering
only key employees); second, as a means of reserving a tax
subsidy for plans that provide some social benefit; and
third, as a means of affirmatively encouraging the
15. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33-34
(1926); Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 165, 53 Stat. 67
(1939).
16. See George T. Altman, Pension Trusts for Key Men, TAX MAG., June,
1937, at 324. Two cases before the Board of Tax Appeals approved plans that
provided benefits only to a group of highly paid individuals. See Moore v.
Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 1073 (1941); Harris v. Comm'r, B.T.A.M. (P-H) 39,472
(1939).
2001] 633
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formation of pension plans that provide such benefits. 17
Historical evidence exists to support each of these views.
Indeed, some of the historical debate is not over which view
is correct, but rather over which view predominated policy
thought in 1942.18
All three views continue to provide perspective for
discussion of pension and tax policy, although we believe
that today the third idea is understood more in terms of
trying to effect broad pension coverage in the general
population, especially of rank-and-file employees who are
unlikely to save adequately for retirement on their own. For
example, the report of the House Ways and Means
Committee on the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the most
significant tax legislation in the last half-century, observed
that the purpose of the nondiscrimination rules is to
"ensurle] that tax-favored qualified plans provide benefits
for low- and middle-income employees who otherwise might
not have reasonable retirement savings." 9
B. Operation of Nondiscrimination Rules and Limitations
on Their Effectiveness
As we earlier observed, the traditional understanding of
the nondiscrimination rules was that they required defined
contribution plans to be tested on a contributions basis,
with the plan considered nondiscriminatory so long as
contributions for both rank-and-file employees and highly
paid employees reflected the same percentage of
compensation. Thus, for example, a firm's defined
contribution plan would satisfy the nondiscrimination rules
if in a given year the firm contributed $1000 for an
employee with $10,000 of compensation and $10,000 for an
employee earning $100,000.
Defined benefit plans, on the other hand, were tested on
a benefits basis by comparing, as a percentage of pay, the
17. See Norman P. Stein, Some Lessons from History: The Origins of Pension
and Profit-Sharing Taxation, 1914-1942, 58 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N, at 12-1
(2000); Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies:
Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L.
REV. 433 (1987); Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement
Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1144-51 (1997).
18. See Stein, supra note 17, at 12-40.
19. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 711 (1985).
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projected annuity benefits at retirement age of rank-and-
file and highly compensated employees. Thus, for example,
a plan that provided an employee with a retirement annuity
equal to 1% of average (or final) pay multiplied by years of
service would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirements
since all participants would receive a benefit based on the
same percentage of their individual compensation.
The nondiscrimination rules do not, however, mandate
that firms provide the type of proportional benefits that the
nondiscrimination principles nominally require. There are a
number of reasons for this divergence from proportionality,
including the Code's coverage rules,"0 special rules
"integrating" private plan benefits with Social Security,2'
and planning devices that use facially neutral rules to
exploit tenure and demographic distinctions between a
firm's rank-and-file and highly compensated employees.22
We describe five important tools (other than cross-testing)
that firms sometimes use to achieve discrimination among
these two groups of employees. We also describe the "top-
heavy" rules, which Congress adopted to direct greater
benefits toward rank-and-file employees in plans that are
heavily weighted to officers, owners and relatively highly
paid employees."
1. Social Security Integration ("Permitted Disparity").
The Internal Revenue Code permits firms sponsoring
defined contribution plans to provide higher contribution
rates for compensation above the Social Security taxable
wage base;24 firms sponsoring defined benefit plans can
provide larger benefit accrual rates for benefits above the
wage base or can reduce benefits by a percentage of Social
Security benefits.2"
20. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763 (2000); I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994).
21. I.R.C. § 401(1) (1994).
22. For example, a firm can provide a minimum employment period before a
plan participant attains a nonforfeitable right to their accrued benefits. See id. §
411 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997) (prescribing minimum vesting standards). Such
minimum periods will sometimes favor highly paid employees, who generally
have longer tenures with a particular firm and thus are more likely to vest in
their benefits.
23. See generally id. § 416 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
24. Rev. Rul. 2000-53, 2000-47 I.R.B. 488 (2000) ($80,400 in 2001).
25. See generally I.R.C. § 401(1) (1994) (outlining social security integration
standards); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-7 (as amended in 1993) (describing how to
20011 635
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2. Coverage Rules. A plan meets the minimum coverage
rules by satisfying one of two alternative tests.6 The first
test is called the ratio percentage test.27 Under this test, the
firm calculates a plan's percentage coverage of highly
compensated employees. The plan must then cover at least
70% of that percentage among rank-and-file employees. 8
Thus, if a plan covers 100% of the highly compensated
employees, it must also cover at least 70% of the non-highly
compensated employees. In other words, this test permits a
firm to cover all of a firm's highly compensated employees
and deny coverage to 30% of the other employees, or to
cover some lesser but proportionate percentage of both sets
of employees.29
If a plan does not pass the ratio percentage test, it may
still pass the average benefit test. Under this rule, the plan
must include and exclude employees under a reasonable
business classification system adopted by the firm." The
firm next must show that the classification is
impute these standards when benefit formula does not explicitly incorporate
statutory formal requirements). For two excellent critiques of the Social
Security integration requirements, see Altman, supra note 17 and Dilley, supra
note 17.
26. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
27. See id. § 410(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-2(b)(2) (as amended in
1994). The Code also includes a third alternative, which simply provides that an
employer's plan cover at least 70% of all non-highly compensated employees, see
I.R.C. § 410(b)(1), but such a plan will also always satisfy the ratio percentage
test, since the firm cannot cover more than 100% of the highly compensated
employees, at least under the rules of math as we understand them.
28. Certain employees are not counted in applying the coverage tests, and
certain other employees may be excluded at the election of the firm. See I.R.C. §
410(b)(3)-(4) (1994).
29. Thus, for example, a plan that covered 50% of the highly compensated
employees would need to cover 35% of the non-highly compensated employees.
30. See id. § 410(b)(2)(A)(i). The statute provides that the plan must benefit
"such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the employer and
found by the Secretary not to be discriminatory in favor of highly compensated
employees." Id. The regulations, in turn, require that the classification be both
"reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory." See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4 (as amended
in 1992). For a classification to be "reasonable" it must be one
established under objective business criteria that identify the category
of employees who benefit under the plan. Reasonable classifications
generally include specified job categories, nature of compensation (i.e.,
salary or hourly), geographic location, and similar bona fide business
criteria. An enumeration of employees by name or other specific
criteria having substantially the same effect as an enumeration by
name is not considered a reasonable classification.
Id. § 1.410(b)-4(b).
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nondiscriminatory, which involves applying a weaker
version of the ratio percentage test, where the ratio of the
general test is reduced to as low as 20%, depending on the
concentration of non-highly compensated employees in the
workforce." The final component of the average benefit test
requires that the average benefit of the rank-and-file
employees, as a percentage of pay, is at least 70% of the
average benefit of the highly compensated employees. 2
Thus, this test expressly contemplates a substantially lower
rate of benefits (as a percentage of pay) for rank-and-file
employees. Firms can also game both the ratio percentage
and average benefits tests by including in their plans the
lowest paid rank-and-file employees, and/or providing high
rates of benefits (as a percentage of pay) for the least well
paid of the non-highly compensated employees.3 Moreover,
average benefits under this test are calculated after
adjusting for Social Security integration. 4
Moreover, the nondiscrimination regulations permit a
plan to be divided into what amounts to sub-plans created
for each of the allocation or benefit rates of each highly
compensated employee. These sub-plans, which are referred
to as rate groups, are then tested individually for
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4(c). The regulations provide both a "safe
harbor" ratio percentage and an "unsafe harbor" ratio percentage. See id. §
1.410(b)-4(c)(4)(i)-(ii). The classification is deemed automatically
nondiscriminatory if it tests within the safe harbor percentage and
discriminatory if it tests in the unsafe harbor. See id. § 1.410(b)-4(c)(1)-(2). If
the classification tests between the two harbors, the plan must demonstrate on
a facts-and-circumstances basis that the classification is nondiscriminatory. Id.
§ 1.410(b)-4(c)(3). The regulations provide certain relevant facts and
circumstances, including the underlying purpose of the business classification
and the overall percentage of employees benefiting under the plan. See id. §
1.410(b)-4(c)(3)(ii). The safe harbor percentage is as high as 50% for workforces
in which no more than 60% of the workforce is non-highly compensated, and
drops as low as 20.75% when 99% of the workforce is non-highly compensated.
See id. § 1.410(b)-4(c)(4)(iv).
32. I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994). The percentage is based on an employee's
participation in all plans of the employer. Id. § 410(b)(2)(C)(i). All employees of
the employer, except for certain statutorily excluded and excludable employees,
see id. § 410(b)(3)-(4), are taken into consideration in applying the average
benefits component of the test, including those employees who do not
participate in any plan of the employer. Id. § 410(b)(2)(B), (D).
33. Under the average benefit test, the average is computed as the mean of
the benefit rates among each class of worker, not as overall benefits divided by
overall compensation for each class of worker. See id. § 410(b)(2)(B)-(C). In other
words, the average is computed without weighting by compensation.
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-5(d)(6) (as amended in 1993).
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compliance with the minimum coverage tests. If all of the
rate groups would satisfy the minimum coverage test, then
the overall plan is deemed nondiscriminatory in benefits or
contributions.
3. Forfeitures for Short Tenures. A firm may design a
plan that conditions benefit receipt on the employee
achieving a specified minimum tenure with the firm. The
Internal Revenue Code constrains firms in the design of
such forfeiture conditions; under current law, firms
generally may require no more than five years of service
before benefits become nonforfeitable."5 In some firms,
however, the distribution of completed job tenures is
substantially more skewed toward shorter tenures among
rank-and-file employees than among highly compensated
employees. In such firms, a much smaller percentage of
rank-and-file workers than highly compensated employees
will achieve nonforfeitable benefit rights.
4. Providing Past Service Credits and Retroactive
Benefit Increases. When a firm adopts a defined benefit
plan, it can credit participants with benefit credits for
service prior to the time the plan was adopted. Similarly, a
firm is permitted to amend an existing defined benefit plan
to improve the plan's benefit formula, and the enhanced
benefit formula may, at the firm's option, apply to credits
based on earlier years of service. The firm's highly
compensated employees will disproportionately benefit from
such credits if their job tenures tend to be longer than those
of rank-and-file workers. Smaller firms would presumably
award past-service credit when their highly compensated
employees would disproportionately benefit from such
credits. To limit such abuses, the regulations limit past-
service credits in certain circumstances in which they would
be discriminatory.36 Some discrimination is still possible,
since the regulations also include safe harbors allowing five
35. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). A firm may instead use
a graded vesting schedule, under which employees must vest in at least 20% of
their benefits after three years of service, 40% after four years, and so on until
they become 100% vested after seven years of service. See id. § 411(a)(2)(B).
Top-heavy plans are subject to steeper minimum vesting standards. See infra
text accompanying notes 41-45.
36. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-5(a)-(b) (as amended in 1993).
638 [Vol. 49
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years of past-service credit without regard to its
discriminatory effects.87
5. Choice of Plan Format. Even before firms were
permitted to use cross-testing to satisfy the defined
contribution nondiscrimination rules, they were able to
award benefits with greater present values (relative to
current compensation) to older employees through the
adoption of either a traditional defined benefit plan 8 or a
target benefit defined contribution plan.39 Thus, if a firm's
higher paid employees were older than its rank-and-file
workers, the firm could favor the higher paid workers
through the adoption of one of these types of plans.
Moreover, a firm that adopted a defined benefit plan format
could in many circumstances further skew benefits toward
older, favored employees through adoption of either the
fractional or the 3% accrual methods, both permitted by the
Internal Revenue Code.40
37. Id. § 1.401(a)(4)-5(a)(3).
38. Defined benefit plans favor older employees principally because these
plans are normally tested on a benefits basis; a dollar contribution to a plan
buys a larger retirement age annuity for an older employee because of the time
value of money. In addition, defined benefit plans can base the annuity on an
employee's final compensation, see supra note 8, which will favor an employee
who reaches retirement age at the firm sponsoring the plan. For a discussion of
why traditional defined benefit formulas favor older employees, see Norman P.
Stein, Simplification and IRC § 415, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 69, 79-81 (1994)
[hereinafter Stein, Simplification and IRC § 415].
39. Target benefit plans are money-purchase defined contribution plans that
set contributions at a rate designed to create a plan account sufficient to
purchase a targeted lifetime annuity benefit. Target benefit plans are, then, an
early form of cross-tested plan. However, the contributions under the plan had
to be based on a particular funding method-the level premium funding
method-which produced a lower age-weighted disparity in contribution levels
than did defined contribution plans cross-tested under the testing methodology
permitted in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8 (as amended in 1993). See Rev. Rul. 76-
464, 1976-2 C.B. 115. See generally Labh S. Hira & Paul Perry, Target Benefit
Plans: An Appealing Option for Small Employers, TAX ADVISER, Jan. 1987, at
330.
40. Defined benefit formulas have to conform to one of three sets of accrual
standards. One standard, the fractional rule, permits a plan to provide a flat
benefit at retirement age (for example, 100% of final pay) and multiply it by a
fraction, the numerator of which is an employee's years of actual plan
participation, and the denominator of which is the participant's projected years
of plan participation through normal retirement age. See I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(C)
(1994). Thus, a fifty-five year old lawyer would accrue 10% of the plan's flat
benefit per year, but her twenty-five year old secretary would accrue only 4% of
640 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
The effect of these tools can be to substantially skew
benefits in favor of highly compensated employees,
particularly in smaller firms. In reaction to this reality,
Congress created the concept of a plan becoming top-
heavy,4' which occurs when at least 60% of the benefits
under the plan are for "key employees." 2 If a plan is top-
heavy, it is subject to rules intended to ameliorate this
weighting of benefits: shorter maximum vesting periods"
and a minimum benefit requirement for rank-and-file
employees in favor of such employees.' In the case of a
defined contribution plan, the minimum benefit is a
contribution equal to 3% of compensation.45
his benefit per year, because the lawyer has only ten years until attaining
retirement age while the secretary has forty. Moreover, if the plan terminates
when the lawyer attains age sixty-five, as is likely, the secretary will not have a
chance to earn his full benefit. The 1993 nondiscrimination regulations limit the
extent of discrimination that could be effected through the fractional rule, but
include safe harbors, one of which permits use of the fractional rule so long as
the denominator of the fraction is not less than twenty-five for each participant.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-3(b)(4) (as amended in 1993).
Another accrual method, the 3% rule, could also be used to devote
additional pension resources toward higher earners. The rule, which requires
that in any given year a participant has accrued a benefit equal to at least 3% of
the largest benefit under the plan, would permit the use of the following benefit
formula: during the first nine years of plan participation, a participant accrues
a benefit equal to 3% of pay, and in the tenth year a benefit equal to 73% of pay.
So long as a fifty-five year old business owner does not employ an employee for
the ten year period between plan adoption and retirement, the formula can
effect a substantial degree of discrimination in the last year of the plan,
assuming the plan will be terminated when the owner attains age sixty-five.
This aggressively discriminatory use of the 3% rule has also been curbed by the
nondiscrimination regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-3.
41. See I.R.C. § 416(g) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
42. See id. § 416(g)(1)(A). The term "key employee" is designed to identify
employees with a proprietary interest in the firm and thus is both broader and
narrower than the term "highly compensated employee," which is primarily
focused on employees with compensation exceeding a threshold level. Compare
id. § 416(i)(1) ("key employee" includes ten highest paid employees, certain
officers, and certain owners) with id. § 416(q) (1994) ("highly compensated
employee" includes any employee who received compensation in excess of
$80,000 (as indexed for inflation, currently $85,000, I.R.S. News Release IR-99-
80 (Oct. 19, 1999)), or who falls within the top 20% of employees ranked on the
basis of compensation paid, as well as certain owners).
43. See I.R.C. § 416(b) (1994). Section 416(b) substitutes a three year cliff
vesting rule for the otherwise applicable five year cliff vesting rule, see I.R.C. §
411(a)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996), and a six year graded vesting rule for the
otherwise applicable seven year graded vesting rule. Id. § 411(a)(2)(B).
44. See id. § 416(c) (1994).
45. Id. § 416(c)(2)(A). The top-heavy rules originally contained a
CROSS-TESTED PLANS
C. Background on Cross-Testing
Since 1942, the Code has required nondiscrimination in
"the contributions or benefits" of qualified plans.46 The
original understanding of this provision was that defined
contribution plans were tested on the basis of contributions
and defined benefit plans on the basis of benefits. It is clear
that at least through 1970, and possibly through most of
the 1980s, the IRS did not permit cross-testing of either a
stand-alone defined contribution plan or a group of two or
more defined contribution plans for minimum coverage as if
they were a single plan.47
The idea of cross-testing was created for a special
situation: when a firm aggregated a defined contribution
plan with a defined benefit plan. Such situations required a
methodology in which the benefits in one plan could be
compared with the contributions in the other. The IRS
responded to this need with a series of revenue rulings,
which provided a means for testing the aggregated plans on
either a benefits or contributions basis. A 1970 ruling
limited the methodology to aggregations of defined benefit
and defined contribution plans, stating that "the test for
modification of I.R.C. § 415(e), which limited the extent to which an employer
could make maximum contributions to a defined contribution plan and also
provide a maximum annuity benefit under I.R.C. § 415(c) and (b), respectively.
I.R.C. § 415(e) was repealed by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, Title I § 1452(a), 100 Stat. 1816 (1996). For a description of
former § 415(e), see Stein, Simplification and IRC § 415, supra note 38, at 73-
76.
46. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, 862-
63 (1942); I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994).
47. See Rev. Rule 70-580, 1970-2 C.B. 90. However, Brian A. Graff, the
Executive Director of the American Society of Pension Actuaries, has written
that "s]ince 1981, Treasury and IRS guidance has permitted qualified plans to
satisfy the Code's nondiscrimination requirements by effectively comparing
contributions under a defined contribution plan to the benefits that would be
received under a defined benefit plan." BRIAN GRAFF, SALL BUSINESS
RETIREMENT PLANS WILL TERMINATE DUE TO POTENTIAL TREASURY CHANGES TO
QUALIFIED PLAN REGULATIONS: MORE TmIE Is NEEDED TO STUDY THE ISSUE
(2000), http://www.aspa.orglarchivepages/gac/2000/newcomppaper.htm. In a
phone conversation with one of the authors of this article, ir. Graff indicated
that no written formal guidance permitting cross-testing of stand-alone plans
existed, but that the practice was permitted by at least some IRS regional
offices.
48. See Rev. Rul. 70-580, 1970-2 C.B. 90; Rev. Rul. 74-165, 1974-1 C.B. 96;
Rev. Rul. 74-166, 1974-1 C.B. 97; Rev. Rul. 81-202, 1981 C.B. 70; Rev. Rul. 83-
110, 1983-2 C.B. 70.
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discrimination in this case is made with respect to
contributions since a money purchase pension plan and a
profit sharing plan are involved."49
It was not until 1993 that the IRS explicitly approved a
methodology that could be used not only for testing
aggregated defined benefit and defined contribution plans,
but also for testing single defined contribution plans or
aggregations of two defined contribution plans." The
methodology became, in essence, a safe harbor for testing
single or aggregated defined contribution plans on a
benefits basis.
We turn now to an illustration of how a small firm can
use cross-testing to disproportionately favor a highly
compensated employee. Consider a firm with one older,
high-earning owner and several younger, lower-paid
workers, all earning less than the social security wage
base.5' The firm has a defined contribution pension plan
that covers the older owner and all of the younger, lower-
paid workers. Assuming the plan were integrated with
social security, the firm could set a higher contribution rate
(up to 5.7% higher) for earnings above the maximum Social
Security taxable wage base than below it without violating
the nondiscrimination rules. Such a differential
contribution rate would benefit only the highly
compensated employee.
Under cross-testing, however, the firm could direct still
additional pension contributions to the older owner. Cross-
testing allows the defined contribution plan to be tested in
terms of the hypothetical retirement benefits projected for
each worker (which is the general nondiscrimination test
for defined benefit plans) rather than the amount of the
actual contribution made on behalf of each worker (the
general nondiscrimination test for defined contribution
plans).52 The longer the number of years before retirement
during which any given contribution earns interest (and
benefits from the power of compound interest), the larger
the hypothetical retirement benefit from any given
contribution.
49. Rev. Rul. 70-580, 1970-2 C.B. 90.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8 (as amended in 1993).
51. Our example reflects the year 2000 limit of $30,000 for additions to a
defined contribution account; in 2001 the limitation, which is indexed to the
cost of living, is $35,000. See I.R.C. § 415(c) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8.
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Since younger workers have more years until
retirement than older workers, $1 put into the account of a
younger worker produces a larger hypothetical retirement
benefit than $1 put into the account of an older worker.
Therefore, if the testing is done on the basis of the
hypothetical retirement benefits that ultimately can be paid
from the contributions, rather than on the basis of the
actual contributions themselves, the contributions the
employer makes on behalf of the younger workers can be
substantially lower than the contributions the employer
makes on behalf of the older workers. For example, if the
firm applies a projected return of 8.5% per year to compute
hypothetical retirement benefits, and if the owner is sixty
years old while the younger workers are all twenty-one
years old, the contribution rate for the sixty year old owner
can be twenty or more times larger than the average
contribution rate for twenty-one year old workers without
causing the employer to fail to meet the nondiscrimination
test.
5 3
The first generation of defined contribution cross-tested
plans used the relationship between age and projected
retirement benefits to skew contributions toward older
owners. But the pension industry has recently created new
versions of cross-tested plans that allow even more skewing
toward high-income workers. These plans, often called "new
comparability" plans, provide higher benefits only to
specific favored older employees (for example, older
owners), while providing much smaller benefits to other
older employees. 4 One pension firm, whose Web site claims
53. For example, assume the contribution rate on behalf of all the younger
twenty-one year old workers is 1% (i.e., the contribution is equal to 1% of
compensation for each worker). Given 8.5% annual growth over the forty-four
years between age twenty-one and age sixty-five, each worker's account balance
from that contribution would grow to 36.2% of current compensation. Since the
projected retirement benefits are directly proportional to this accumulated
balance, the older owner can therefore receive a contribution that would grow to
36.2% of current compensation. A current contribution of 24.1% of
compensation would accumulate to 36.2% after five years. Therefore, the
contribution rate for the owner could be as high as 24.1% of current
compensation while the younger worker received pension contributions equal to
only 1% of compensation. This example assumes that the plan is not subject to
the top-heavy rules.
54. The terminology used to describe these plans is sometimes confusing:
Some pension experts refer to the first generation of cross-tested plans as "age-
weighted" and refer to new comparability plans as "cross-tested." A related
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that it pioneered the new comparability approach,
advertises that the "plan design allows contributions up to
$30,000 for senior executives without raising the
contribution for the other employees."55 Similarly, an article
in Physician's News Digest noted that "[w]hen used
aggressively, new comparability cross-testing enables
physicians to maximize their retirement plan contributions
while at the same time reducing the total contribution for
the year."
56
Under the first generation of cross-tested plans, all
older employees would benefit from the tilting of
contributions toward older workers, while a younger owner
would get little from the cross-tested pension plan. Under a
new comparability plan, the firm can make relatively large
contributions on behalf of an older owner and a younger
owner, while making relatively small contributions to all
other workers (both older and younger). Fundamentally,
the new comparability plans "carve out" older non-owners
from the most lucrative components of the plan, and "carve
innovation to the new comparability plan is the "superintegrated" plan, which
skews benefits to high-income owners by setting a very high compensation
threshold beyond which the plan provides a substantially higher contribution
rate.
55. Louis KRAvrrz & AssocIATEs, INc., PLAN DESIGN OVERVIEW (1998),
available at http://www.lkravitz.com/pdfLfiles/new_comparability.pdf ("We call
this plan design 'New Comparability.'") (last visited Apr. 24, 2001) (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review). Similar claims can be found on a host of other web
sites of pension consulting firms. See, e.g., New Comparability: Alive and Well,
BENEFIT INSIGHTS (W. E. Stanley & Company, Inc.), Dec. 2000,
http://www.westanley.com/binsight/12-2000.html ("[Iun many cases cross-tested
plans will continue to provide an optimum plan design to benefit the owners
and key employees of a plan sponsor.") (on file with the Buffalo Law Review);
Arizona Qualified Plan Services, Inc., New Comparability Profit Sharing and
401(k) Plans, at http://www.aqps.com/newcomp.htm (n.d.) (last visited Apr. 24,
2001) ("The discrimination test is passed if the employees in the favored groups
are older than the employees in the less favored groups with lower contribution
percentages.") (on file with the Buffalo Law Review); Texas Pension
Consultants, New Comparibility Retirement Plans, at http://
www.texaspension.comlpc/newcomparability/html (n.d.) (last visited Apr. 24,
2001) ("[Tlhese plans work best for employers whose owners and highly
compensated employees are older (on average) than the company's other
employees.") (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
56. Joseph Nicola, Reconfiguring Your Practice's Pension Plan, PHYSICIAN'S
NEws DIGEST, Feb. 1999, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/
finance/299.html (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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in" younger owners into more attractive pension
arrangements. 7
Table 1 offers an illustrative example of how the new
approaches can tilt contributions toward favored owners.
The firm has two co-owners and six workers.
Table 1
Age Compensation Contributions Integrated First- New
Equal to 15% with Social Generation Comparability
of Pay Security Cross- Plan
Tested Plan
Owners
55 $150,000 $22,500 $23,993 $29,420 $30,000
50 $150,000 $22,500 $23,993 $19,566 $30,000
Workers
60 $40,000 $6000 $5276 $11,797 $1200"
50 $35,000 $5250 $4617 $4565 $1050.
45 $30,000 $4500 $3957 $2602 $900"
25 $25,000 $3750 $3298 $750" $750"
21 $20,000 $3000 $2638 $600" $600"
21 $15,000 $2250 $1979 $450" $450"
TOTAL $465,000 $69,750 $69,750 $69,750 $64,950
Owners $300,000 $45,000 $47,985 $48,986 $60,000
Workers $165,000 $24,750 $21,765 $20,764 $4950
Owners' 65% 65% 69% 70% 92%
% of
total
Reflects 3% mandatory contribution for top-heavy plans.
The owners are aged fifty and fifty-five, and the
workers range in age from twenty-one to sixty. The third
column in the table shows the compensation earned by each
person in the firm: The owners earn $150,000 each, and the
workers earn between $15,000 (for one of the twenty-one
year old workers) and $40,000 (for the sixty year old
worker). Under the pension arrangements we examine, we
have assumed that the plan is top-heavy and therefore all
57. Technically, a new comparability plan creates separate contribution
rates for different types of workers, for example, owners and employees. The
contribution rates are arranged to produce higher allocations for owners (and
other favored employees) and lower allocations for rank-and-file workers. The
trick of the new comparability design is to be able to create rate groups with
different combinations of employees, with each rate group satisfying the
nondiscrimination rules on a benefits basis.
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employees will receive contributions of at least 3% of
compensation. The table shows the pension contributions
made on behalf of each person in the firm under different
pension arrangements.
1. Defined Contribution Plan with Contributions Equal
to 15% of Pay. Under the simplest defined contribution
plan, each worker receives 15% of pay in his or her pension.
As shown in the fourth column of the table, total pension
payments amount to $69,750, and the owners receive 65%
of that amount. This pension plan is the simplest to
understand: each worker receives a contribution equal to
15% of pay.
2. Integrated with Social Security. The next column
shows one way in which the owners can tilt more of the
contributions to themselves while keeping the total
contribution amount the same. Even if the pension plan is
tested on the basis of contributions, the owners can capture
more of the contributions by taking advantage of various
ways in which the nondiscrimination tests are relaxed. The
fifth column shows the results when the firm takes
advantage of the Social Security integration rules by
contributing a higher percentage of pay above the
maximum taxable Social Security earnings level in 2000
($76,200). Since the owners are the only ones in the firm
with earnings above that level, they enjoy higher
contribution rates than the rest of the firm, raising the
percentage of contributions that accrue to the owners to
69%. By design, the total contributions to the pension plan
remain $69,750.
3. First-Generation Cross-Tested. The next column of
the table shows the results for a cross-tested plan of the
first generation, under which the plan's hypothetical
retirement benefits rather than actual contributions are
examined for nondiscrimination testing purposes. Since the
two owners are older than the average worker, this
approach allows the owners to tilt the benefits further in
their direction. Under this traditional cross-tested plan, the
owners are able to capture 70% of the total contributions
while still enjoying the tax advantages enjoyed by qualified
pension plans. Note, however, that the fifty year old owner
receives a lower pension contribution than the fifty-five
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year old owner and that the sixty year old worker receives a
relatively large contribution. Total contributions remain
$69,750.
4. New Comparability. The final column of the table
shows the results for the new comparability plan. The
owners of the firm enjoy an astonishing 92% of the
contributions under this plan, yet it still qualifies for the
tax advantages provided by pension law. Note that relative
to the traditional cross-tested plan, the firm has
dramatically boosted the contribution for the fifty year old
owner and dramatically reduced the contribution for the
sixty year old worker. Also note that the firm's total
contributions have declined, despite the increase in
contributions made on behalf of the owners: The total
contributions are now $64,950, because the contributions
made on behalf of workers are now only one-quarter (or
less) of their level under the other plans.
II. PROFESSOR ZELINSKY'S ARGUMENT
Professor Zelinsky defends the first generation of cross-
tested defined contribution plans by arguing that employers
can achieve the same pattern of discrimination in favor of
older employees by adopting a defined benefit plan.58
(Professor Zelinsky assumes that all backloaded defined
benefit plans are fully consistent not only with the
nondiscrimination rules but also with the conceptual
framework of the nondiscrimination principle.) He argues
that "[there is no reason why a distribution of pension
resources substantively acceptable when effected through
the defined benefit motif should be deemed discriminatory
when accomplished via the defined contribution form.
Fundamentally, he views a cross-tested defined
contribution plan as equivalent to a defined benefit plan.
Therefore, and since substance should control over form in
this setting, cross-tested defined contribution plans should
be permissible under the nondiscrimination rules as long as
defined benefit plans are. Indeed, Professor Zelinsky views
the ability to accomplish the discrimination in a defined
contribution format positively, since it spares employers the
58. See Zelinsky, Is Cross Testing a Mistake?, supra note 9, at 594-97, 611.
59. Id. at 611.
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regulatory costs of maintaining a defined benefit plan.
Professor Zelinsky similarly defends the second generation
of cross-tested plans (new comparability plans) by arguing
that employers can achieve the same results through a
combination of plans (and other sophisticated techniques).
In summary, Professor Zelinsky's argument is that
since the Code countenances a given level of discrimination
in some settings, it is rational for it to tolerate it in all
situations. He concludes that the law would be improved
either by (i) eliminating the nondiscrimination rules; or (ii)
simplifying them through a top-heavy type of approach for
all plans.
III: ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR ZELINSKY'S ARGUMENTS
A. Qualified Plans As a Tax Expenditure
The first of Professor Zelinsky's alternative
conclusions-that policy-makers should eliminate the
nondiscrimination rules-reflects his belief that deferred
compensation plans do not involve tax expenditures." As he
notes, "the premise that qualified plan law constitutes a tax
expenditure, while widely accepted, is unconvincing.
Without that premise it is difficult to justify much of the
regulation of qualified plans, regulation rationalized on the
grounds that it controls and channels the putative tax
subsidy to qualified plans."6 Note that this argument is
much broader than the cross-testing debate: It involves the
entire set of regulations applying to qualified pension
plans.62
Given the structure of the current U.S. tax code, it
appears difficult to argue that qualified pension plans do
not result in tax expenditures. In particular, qualified
contributions are deductible at the firm level and excluded
from taxable income at the individual level. The
accumulation of funds within a pension plan is not taxed;
this tax-free "inside build-up" provides a significant rather
than an additional tax benefit. (It is important to note that
pension accumulations are taxed upon withdrawal, and the
60. See id. at 613.
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. See generally, Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Qualified
Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1988).
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tax expenditure should therefore be properly measured in
net present value terms.) Since the tax preferences
accorded to qualified pension plans cause foregone revenue
that could have been used for other public purposes,
regulation to ensure that the tax expenditure is meeting
some policy objective is justifiable.63
One pension economist, Richard Ippolito of George
Mason University, has argued that the pension rules'
departure from normative tax principles can be justified as
a means of partly ameliorating the double taxation of
savings under an income tax.' Ippolito's argument,
however, is really an argument for a consumption tax base,
a question that we regard as distinct from Professor
Zelinsky's view that the tax treatment of pension plans is
not a tax expenditure under an income tax base or that that
expenditure does not require a social policy objective
extrinsic to a normative definition of income.
The nondiscrimination rules were designed to meet one
such policy objective: to ensure that lower- and middle-
income workers share in the tax benefits from the qualified
plan. As a well-known pension treatise notes:
A fundamental requirement of a tax-favored retirement plan is
that the benefits or contributions under the plan must not favor
highly compensated employees. Otherwise employers would be
able to provide benefits only to highly compensated employees or
could provide significant benefits to such employees and de
minimis benefits to other employees. This is hardly the behavior
Congress intended in establishing the tax incentives for
retirement plans. Accordingly, the nondiscrimination rules
prohibit plan benefits or contributions from favoring highly
compensated employees.
65
63. See, e.g., Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement
Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 419-34
(1984); Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to
Professor Zelinsky, 9 AMI. J. TAx POL'Y 225 (1991); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified
Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 A1. J.
TAX POLY 257 (1991). We do agree with Professor Zelinsky's alternative
conclusion, that it would be desirable to rethink the nondiscrimination rules
and move toward a top-heavy type set of rules to replace the existing system.
We return to that argument infra at notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
64. See generally RICHARD IPPOLITO, AN ECONOMIc APPRAISAL OF PENSION
TAX POLICY (1990).
65. DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMiENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 75 (7th ed.
1996). For a different perspective on the origins of the nondiscrimination rules,
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Perhaps more important, Congress has expressly
regarded the tax treatment of qualified plans as justified by
social concerns extrinsic to the definition of an income tax
base. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, for example, includes the following:
For many years, the committee has supported measures that
provide tax incentives designed to encourage employers to provide
retirement benefits for rank-and-file employees. It has been the
committee's intention that these tax incentives, which are more
valuable for individuals with high levels of income because of their
marginal tax rates, should be available to employers only if their
plans provide benefits for rank-and-file employees.
6 6
In summary, most analysts and policy-makers agree
that qualified pension plans generate tax expenditures. As
such, nondiscrimination rules and other forms of regulation
are warranted. The remainder of this article thus assumes
that some version of nondiscrimination rules is justified.
Even if he agreed that some form of nondiscrimination
rules were justifiable, however, Professor Zelinsky would
argue that limitations on cross-testing would create an
internal inconsistency in the current rules. This argument,
as noted above, is predicated on the observation that the
backloading of pension allocations toward older workers
that can be accomplished under a cross-tested defined
contribution plan can also be accomplished under a defined
benefit plan. Since the defined benefit plan passes the
nondiscrimination rules, the argument goes, so should the
cross-tested defined contribution plan. We now turn to
examining this argument.
B. Inequivalency of Defined Benefit and Cross-Tested
Defined Contribution Plans
Professor Zelinsky's "substance should control over
form" position incorrectly assumes that cross-tested defined
contribution plans are equivalent to defined benefit plans
with the same allocation of pension resources across the
firm's workers in any particular year. The equivalency does
not hold more broadly, however, undermining the assertion
that the substance of the two plans is indeed the same. In
see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
66. H.R. Rep. No. 99-313, at 578 (1986).
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the absence of equivalent substance, we see no reason to
expect the nondiscrimination rules to be equivalent: Policy-
makers must balance the benefits and costs of different
plans, and it is appropriate to have the nondiscrimination
rules applicable to a specific type of plan reflect that
balance.
A critical difference between a defined benefit pension
plan and a defined contribution plan (whether or not it is
cross-tested) involves the sharing of risk. In a defined
benefit plan, the worker does not face investment risk
during the pre-retirement accumulation stage (since the
plan sponsor assumes such risk). Moreover, a worker may
face only part of longevity risk (since defined benefit plans
provide life annuities, but are generally not indexed post-
retirement),"7 and does not face the dynamic risk of saving
insufficiently over a career in anticipation of steep late-
career compensation increases. 8  The relatively high
regulatory costs of defined benefit plans are related to these
types of risk shifting. In a defined contribution plan, by
contrast, a worker generally must face such risks
individually.69
Professor Zelinsky himself notes that defined benefit
and defined contribution plans are not equivalent in terms
of risk-sharing: "Many commentators believe that the
defined benefit format, since it shifts investment risk to the
employer, is for many employees economically desirable in
comparison with defined contribution arrangements under
67. It is worth noting that the vast majority of defined benefit plans, despite
providing annuities, still expose retirees to longevity risk because most annuity
payments are defined in nominal rather than inflation-adjusted terms. Over
time, therefore, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the annuity falls, partially
exposing retirees to longevity risk.
68. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2 (considering the nature of these
risks).
69. To be sure, individuals can attenuate their exposure to these risks by
adopting conservative investment strategies during the accumulation stage and
purchasing an immediate life annuity upon retirement. But such risk-reduction
strategies often have significant costs because of market imperfections. The
private annuity market, for example, is characterized by selection effects: Those
purchasing annuities tend to have longer life expectancies than the typical
person. Insurance companies therefore price life annuities based on the pool of
annuitants (with longer-than-average life expectancies) rather than the
population as a whole. As a result, the expected net present value of annuity
payments for the typical individual is 10-15% below the lump-sum purchase
price. See Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money's Worth of
Individual Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1299 (1999).
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which investment risk (and reward) belong to the
employees."" In a footnote, Professor Zelinsky then
indicates that he is one of those commentators.71 Since risk-
sharing is a non-trivial concern, and since defined
contribution and defined benefit plans generally differ in
their risk-sharing characteristics, a cross-tested defined
contribution plan is generally not equivalent to a defined
benefit plan. Other differences also exist.72 Therefore, even
if substance should control over form, the substance differs
and the permissibility of defined benefit plans under the
Code does not necessarily imply that cross-tested defined
contribution plans should be permitted.
To be sure, the inequitable pension resource allocations
achieved by a cross-tested defined contribution plan can be
replicated within a defined benefit plan. Rather than
suggesting the permissibility of cross-tested defined
contribution plans, however, such equivalency highlights
the importance of weighing the benefits of a defined benefit
plan against its costs and perhaps for questioning the
availability of defined benefit plans in circumstances under
which the discriminatory impacts rather than the risk-
sharing effects predominate. In larger firms, the risk-
shifting characteristics of a defined benefit plan, combined
with the difficulty of designing a plan to favor specific
employees or even groups of employees while still satisfring
70. Zelinsky, Is Cross Testing a Mistake?, supra note 9, at 593.
71. See id. at 593 n.55.
72. Most cross-tested plans are profit-sharing plans to which firms decide
whether and how much to contribute annually. In contrast, a firm cannot open
and close the benefits spigot in a defined benefit plan on an annual basis;
participants generally accrue benefits each year during a plan's life. In addition,
the Internal Revenue Code limits deductible contributions to profit-sharing
plans to 15% of the compensation of the participants, I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(I)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997), a limit not present in defined benefit plans. The Code
also applies a special minimum participation requirement for defined benefit
plans, id. § 401(a)(26), which at one time also applied to defined contribution
plans. Congress subsequently limited the rule to defined benefit plans after
determining that the abuse to which it was directed (setting up small defined
benefit plans to benefit primarily owners) was not present in defined
contribution plans. However, new comparability plans enable the same type of
abuse that the section itself was designed to counter. Finally, and perhaps most
important, most defined benefit plans are insured by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), so employees are shielded not only from
investment risk but also the risk of employer underfimding. Cross-tested
defined contribution plans are not defined contribution plans and therefore are
not insured.
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the nondiscrimination rules, suggest that its public policy
benefits will usually outweigh its costs. We would argue
that the Code should therefore continue to allow such plans
even while disallowing cross-tested defined contribution
plans.
The situation is somewhat more complicated in smaller
firms, where the majority of cross-tested defined
contribution plans is found." In smaller firms, the benefits
of actual defined benefit plans may be more apparent than
real. 4 In particular, small defined benefit plans are often
designed to provide benefits primarily for proprietary
employees and risk-shifting effectively does not occur. The
regulatory costs associated with defined benefit plans are
thus largely wasted, and the inequitable resource allocation
(similar to that in a cross-tested defined contribution plan)
is unjustified.
As noted above, three types of risk-shifting may occur
in a defined benefit plan setting: investment risk, mortality
risk, and compensation escalation risk. We analyze each of
these risks in the context of a small firm, with an owner
employee and several nonproprietary employees. In our
analysis, we assume that (i) the firm adopted the plan at a
time when the owner was older than the nonproprietary
employees and that (ii) the firm will terminate the plan
when the owner retires, approximately ten years after the
plan's adoption. In such a plan, the bulk of the firm's
contributions will fund the owner's benefit accruals
(because of the disparity of age between the owner and the
other employees), just as in a cross-tested defined
contribution plan.
1. Risk-Shifting with Respect to Owner.
a. Investment Risk. Since the firm's owner is funding
the plan with her own resources, the investment risk is only
73. See Press Release, American Society of Pension Actuaries, ASPA Survey
Confirms "New Comparability" Expands Small Business Retirement Plan
Coverage (May 17, 2000), available at http'J/www.aspa.org/archivepages/
ga/2000/newcomppressrel.htm (on file with the Buffalo Law Review)
[hereinafter ASPA Survey]. The survey of 10,000 new comparability plans
found that 90% of such plans were adopted by businesses with fifty or fewer
employees; 36% were maintained by plans with fewer than ten employees. Id.
74. See Stein, supra note 12, at 1410. See generally Daniel Halperin &
Marla Schnall, Regulating Tax Qualified Pension Plans in a Hybrid World, 58
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N, at 5-1 (2000).
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nominally transferred to the plan. The owner will benefit
from better-than-anticipated investment return in the form
of lower future contributions to the plan (or larger benefits
or a larger reversion at the plan's termination) and will
suffer from lower-than-expected investment return.
b. Longevity Risk. The Internal Revenue Code requires
that defined benefit plans provide an annuity form of
benefit, at least as the normal form of benefit. A participant
who takes benefits in this form ensures that her pension
savings will not be exhausted prior to death. Thus, the
participant is protected, at least partly, from the risk of
longer-than-anticipated mortality, which we refer to as
longevity risk. In effect, this risk is shifted to some
combination of the employer and the pool of other plan
participants who take annuitized benefits. In the case of the
small firm we have described, however, the owner cannot
effectively shift the actuarial risk of longevity to the firm
because the firm and owner are virtually identical. The
owner is also unable to shift the risk to the pool of other
employees because the present value of the benefits of the
other employees are too small, and their starting date too
distant, to justify annuitization. We note that the owner can
shift risk by purchasing a commercial annuity contract, but
this will subject the owner to potentially higher costs for the
longevity protection.75
c. Compensation Escalation Risk. A defined benefit
plan, through a final pay formula, can shift the risk of
substantial late-career compensation increases to the firm.
The "risk" is that an employee will experience rapid
compensation increases toward the end of her career and
not be able to finance enough consumption during
retirement to maintain a standard of living close to that
immediately prior to retirement. In other words, the worker
will not have sufficient pension resources accumulated to
finance an acceptable replacement rate during retirement.
(If individuals were perfectly rational and forward-looking,
unexpected increases in compensation toward the end of a
career would be mostly saved rather than consumed,
75. Moreover, the risk-shifting here would not have occurred because of the
defined benefit form of plan, but because of the purchase of the annuity
contract.
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obviating this problem. But significant evidence suggests
that most individuals do not behave in a perfectly rational
and forward-looking manner.76 ) The shifting of this risk is
important if a goal of retirement policy thus is to permit an
employee to continue in retirement a percentage of the
compensation income he had achieved in the period
immediately before retirement. One can question whether a
replacement rate target should be an important goal of
national retirement policy, but even assuming it is, the
owner of a firm realizes no shifting of risk by nominally
transferring it to the firm.
2. Risk-shifting with Respect to Nonproprietary
Employees.
a. Investment Risk. A defined benefit plan does shift
the risk of investment return for nonproprietary employees
to the firm. But the societal gain of such risk shifting is
marginal for two reasons. First, the present value of
benefits for such employees (and thus the degree of risk
shifting) is likely to be trivial if the employees are young.
Second, when such employees separate from the firm they
are likely to take their benefits in a lump sum. 7 The
amount of the lump sum is dependent on interest rates at
the time of separation, subjecting them to unpredictable
investment loss due to interest rate fluctuation.
b. Longevity Risk. Because the nonproprietary
employee is likely to take a defined benefit in a lump sum
prior to retirement, the shifting of longevity risk through
the plan is improbable.
c. Compensation Escalation Risk. The nonproprietary
employee will cease participating in the plan long before the
end of her career and thus any shifting of sudden
compensation increases to the firm will generally be trivial.
76. See generally RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL EcONOMICS (1991).
77. The firm can, in fact, force the employee to take a lump sum benefit if
the present value of the benefit is less than $5000, which will often be the
situation for a younger employee.
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Small defined benefit plans of the type we described,
then, offer little of the risk shifting characteristics that the
complicated regulatory structure for defined benefit
arrangements is designed to accommodate. The high
regulatory costs imposed on small defined benefit plans
may effectively act as a "gate charge" that discourages such
plans. Some analysts, including Professor Zelinsky, view
these regulatory costs as unwarranted and problematic
precisely because they discourage defined benefit plans in
small businesses.' 8 Our view differs: We view the regulatory
costs as an impediment to a socially costly form of qualified
plan. Given the failure of many small defined benefit plans
to shift risk significantly, and the related ability of such
small plans to target benefits to a few specific employees,
this disincentive is beneficial from a policy perspective.
We do not, of course, make the claim that all defined
benefit plans in small firms fail to shift meaningful levels of
risk from their participants. Rather, we argue that small
defined benefit plans should be limited to situations in
which meaningful risk-shifting of the sort we described does
occur. As we will describe later, this should require a
factual inquiry into whether a plan is intended to be
permanent from the perspective of covered nonproprietary
employees.79
Put simply, defined benefit plans that do not involve
risk-shifting for participants should not be permitted tax-
qualified status under the Code. The current regulatory
structure, by erecting significant barriers to the adoption of
defined benefit plans in small firms, may represent an
inefficient regulatory approach for accomplishing that goal.
The solution, however, is not to remove any regulatory
obstacles to the adoption of defined benefit plans in small
firms, but rather to adopt a more direct and transparent
approach to limiting them.
We thus reject Professor Zelinsky's argument that the
substance of cross-tested defined contribution plans is
equivalent to that of defined benefit plans. Furthermore,
when such equivalency does roughly obtain, such as in
some small business settings, the implication is that both
forms of plan should be disqualified, not that both forms
should be allowed.
78. See, e.g., Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing a Mistake?, supra note 9, at 610-11.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
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C. I.R.C. §415
A second flaw in Professor Zelinsky's argument relates
to I.R.C. § 415. Section 415 specifies limitations on the
maximum amounts that can be contributed to a defined
contribution plan or received from a defined benefit plan on
behalf of an individual worker. For example, § 415(b)
specifies that for workers retiring at the full benefit age
under Social Security (currently age sixty-five), the
maximum amount that can be received per year in
retirement from a defined benefit plan is $140,000, or 100%
of compensation, whichever is lower. 0 Section 415(c)
specifies that for workers participating in a defined
contribution plan, the maximum combined employer-
employee contribution per year is $35,000, or 25% of
compensation, whichever is lower.8' The limits thus apply
separately to defined contribution and defined benefit
plans. Until January 2000, however, § 415(e) limited the
aggregate amount of benefits and contributions that a firm
could provide if it sponsored both a defined contribution
plan and a defined benefit plan. Effective January 1, 2000,
§ 415(e) was repealed. 2 Because of the constraints of § 415,
some levels of age-based discrimination can be achieved
only through use of cross-testing.
Depending on the assumed interest rate, § 415 limits
the present value of a defined benefit accrual to an amount
less than the annual defined contribution limit until an
employee reaches approximately age forty-five." Consider a
firm with a thirty-five year old owner and a twenty year old
80. The defined benefit limit is set at the lesser of 100% of compensation or
$90,000, with the dollar limit indexed to the cost of living in $5000 increments.
See I.R.C. § 415(b), (d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The dollar limit is currently
$140,000, but is adjusted downward if the benefit begins earlier than social
security retirement age. Id. § 415(b)(2)(C) (1994).
81. The defined contribution limit is set at the lesser of 25% of compensation
or $30,000, with the dollar limit indexed to the cost of living in $5000
increments. See id. §415(c), (d) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The indexing, however,
was delayed until such point as the defined contribution limit would be one-
third of the defined benefit limit. This point occurred when the defined benefit
limit reached $140,000 at the beginning of 2001. Thus, the defined contribution
limit was increased to $35,000.
82. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, Title I, §
1452(a), 110 Stat. 1816 (1996).
83. See generally Stein, Simplification and IRC § 415, supra note 38, at 73-
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employee. If the firm adopts a cross-tested defined
contribution plan, it can test on an age-weighted basis and
still provide the owner with a $35,000 contribution. If the
firm cannot cross-test and wishes to maximize the age-
weighted benefit disparity between the owner and the
younger employee, the firm would have to adopt a defined
benefit plan, which would provide the owner with a benefit
with a smaller present value. Depending on the actuarial
assumptions used, the present value of the benefit accrual
would probably be less than $20,000.84 In addition, the
employer would have the extra administrative and
actuarial expenses associated with a defined benefit plan.
Moreover, even if a defined benefit plan were
substantively equivalent to a cross-tested defined
contribution plan, there is little policy justification for
allowing the firm to create two backloaded plans, as is
effectively the case given the repeal of § 415(e) and the
permissibility of cross-tested defined contribution plans. In
other words, Professor Zelinsky is wrong when he argues
that cross-tested defined contribution plans should be
permitted because the same disparities could be achieved
with a defined benefit plan. A firm can make much larger
age-weighted contributions if it can fund both a defined
benefit plan and a cross-tested defined contribution plan
rather than just a defined benefit plan. It is difficult to see
why two defined benefit plans should be prohibited under §
415(b), but one defined benefit plan (under § 415(b)) plus an
effectively identical defined contribution plan (under §
415(c), combined with cross-testing) should be permissible.
Given the current structure of § 415, Professor Zelinsky's
argument regarding the equivalency of a cross-tested
defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan does
not hold for firms that sponsor both types of plans.
D. Backloaded Pension Plans
Some supporters of cross-testing defend backloaded
benefit formulas as a means of addressing two related
problems that are sometimes encountered by middle-aged
owners of small firms: the firm was not sufficiently
84. Assuming a level-dollar funding method, a 6% interest rate and a
$140,000 annual annuity beginning at age sixty-five, with a projected present
value of $1,400,000 at age sixty-five, the actual contribution would be $17,708.
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profitable when the owner was young to permit the
establishment of a qualified deferred compensation
program, and the owner consequently entered middle age
undersaved for retirement.85 Cross-testing is necessary to
facilitate the owner's rapid accumulation of retirement
wealth during the period beginning with firm prosperity
and ending with retirement.
One can first respond that this justification for cross-
testing applies to a narrower band of small firms than are
actually eligible to use cross-testing. For example, a fifty
year old physician with a twenty-five year old nurse is
eligible to use cross-testing even if she has already
accumulated several million dollars in qualified plans.
Moreover, if we accept that the tax expenditure for
qualified plans finds its justification in helping middle and
lower-income individuals save for retirement, there is a
serious policy problem in a tax regime that helps the
undersaved older proprietary employee save rapidly for
retirement but requires no similar solicitude for the older
undersaved rank-and-file worker, who will almost certainly
be excluded from rapid retirement accumulations in a new
comparability plan. Moreover, a young employee of a firm
with even a first-generation age-weighted plan is unlikely,
later in life, to be employed by a firm with age-weighted
benefits.
If private plans are to provide a significant supplement
to Social Security for lower and middle income individuals,
policy should encourage a pattern of meaningful early
deferrals so that such individuals will benefit from the
compounding of interest. Cross-tested plans, and many
small defined benefit plans, by providing small
contributions for younger employees, are at odds with this
insight.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 86
The policy costs of permitting cross-testing would be
exacerbated by pension changes being debated on Capitol
Hill." Legislation that passed the House of Representatives
85. See, e.g., GRAFF, supra note 47. Professor Zelinsky's article does not raise
these issues.
86. See supra note 13.
87. For a discussion of the problems associated with these proposed
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by a large majority last year (and similar legislation that
cleared the Senate Finance Committee but was not finally
acted upon by the Senate) would have raised various limits
affecting additions to defined contribution plans."
Under current law, the combined employer-employee
contributions to defined contribution plans may not exceed
the lesser of $30,000, or 25% of pay." In addition, tax-
favored pension benefits are currently based on
compensation up to a maximum compensation level of
$170,000. 9° The maximum considered compensation limit,
and the limits on defined contribution amounts, are often
the only limiting factors on contributions for older owners
and partners under new comparability plans. The
legislation would have raised the maximum compensation
level to $200,000, increased the combined employer-
employee contribution limit to $40,000 and eliminated the
requirement that such contributions not exceed 25% of
pay.9' The legislation would also have relaxed the top-heavyprotections.9
To see how the proposed changes could further skew
contributions toward high-income owners, and even
endanger pensions for lower-income workers, consider
again the hypothetical firm explored above.93 We consider
two of the proposed changes in the bills mentioned above:
Increasing the combined employer-employee contribution
limit from $30,000 to $40,000, and relaxing the top-heavy
rules by effectively excluding family members who are not
officers or owners of the firm from the definition of a "key
changes, see PETER R. ORSZAG ET AL., EXACERBATING INEQUITIES IN PENSION
BENEFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION PROVISIONS IN THE TAX BILL (1999),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-8-99tax.htm (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review), and PETER R. ORSZAG ET AL., CRITICISM OF CBPP PENSION ANALYSIS
RESTS ON SELECTIVE USE OF DATA AND LEAVES MISLEADING IMPRESSIONS (1999),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-28-99tax.htm (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
88. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999).
89. The $30,000 dollar amount has since been increased through automatic
indexation to $35,000. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2000-82 (Nov. 20, 2000).
90. See id.
91. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999).
92. See id. § 203.
93. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
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employee" for the purposes of determining whether a plan
is top- heavy.
94
Table 2
Age Compensation New New New
Comparability Comparability Comparability
Plan Current Plan Proposed Plan Top-Heavy
$30,000 $40,000 Protections
Maximum Maximum Relaxed
Owners
55 $150,000 $30,000 $34,590 $30,000
50 $150,000 $30,000 $34,590 $30,000
Workers
60 $40,000 $1200" $1200 $1041
50 $35,000 $1050* $1050 $911
45 $30,000 $900" $900 $781
25 $25,000 $750" $750 $650
21 $20,000 $600" $600 $520
21 $15,000 $450" $450 $390
TOTAL $465,000 $64,950 $74,131 $64,293
Owners $300,000 $60,000 $69,181 $60,000
Workers $165,000 $4950 $4950 $4293
Owners' % 65% 92% 93% 93%
of total
Reflects 3% mandatory contribution for top-heavy plans.
The third column in Table 2 shows the new
comparability plan under current law. The next column
shows the impact on the new comparability plan of raising
the maximum combined employer-employee contribution
from $30,000 to $40,000. The first effect of the higher limit
is to allow high-income owners to raise their pension
contributions. In our example, the contribution for each
owner increases from $30,000 to $34,590. Advocates of high
contribution limits argue that in many cases, the
nondiscrimination rules would require any such increase in
contributions for high-income owners to be matched by
higher contributions for lower-income workers.
The example highlights why the nondiscrimination
rules often do not require such higher contributions for
lower-income workers, especially in the context of new
94. For purposes of our comparison, we have used the § 415 limit of $30,000
applicable for the year 2000.
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comparability plans. In this example, the contributions
made on behalf of lower-income workers do not increase at
all. Yet the firm still meets the nondiscrimination test
despite the higher contributions for the owners. In other
words, the entire increase in total contributions accrues to
the high-income owners, who already were receiving 92% of
the pension contributions. The change in the maximum
contribution limit allows the owners to accumulate almost
$10,000 more in tax-favored pension saving, and raises
their share of total contributions to 93%. Moreover, if the
owners wished, they could raise their contributions to the
$40,000 limit if they were willing to contribute an
additional $774 for the benefit of the workers (raising the
workers' total benefits from $4950 to $5274).
The final column shows the impact of relaxing the top-
heavy protections as proposed in several legislative
packages. Assume the two owners are spouses. The
proposed changes would allow the firm to avoid the top-
heavy protections simply by having one spouse shift
ownership to the other spouse (while both still receive
$150,000 in compensation). The hypothetical plan would
then no longer be top-heavy, as it is in all the other
examples in the tables. The firm could reduce the
contributions made for all other employees by 13% (from
$4950 to $4300), while maintaining the $30,000
contributions for both spouses. In other words, the proposed
change would not only further skew the contributions
toward the high-income couple, but also reduce pension
contributions for the other workers.
The legislation would also have increased the defined
benefit annuity limit from $135,00 to $160,000,"5 and
permitted plans to pay unreduced benefits at age sixty-two
(which would currently require an actuarial reduction)."
Small firms sponsoring both a defined benefit plan and a
cross-tested defined contribution plan would have been able
to contribute in excess of $150,000 to retirement plans for a
fifty-five rear old with taxable compensation of $160,000
per year. In other words, the firm would be able to pay
deferred compensation equal to over 90% of the highly paid
employee's taxable compensation. At the same time, the
95. See H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 201(a)(1) (1999).
96. See id.
97. This assumes a 7% interest rate and a level fimding method.
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firm could limit its contribution to a twenty-five year old
employee with $25,000 of compensation to about $2000, or
less than 10% of taxable compensation. The tax cost of
getting the employer to contribute the $2000 into a
retirement savings account for the twenty-five year old
under these circumstances is considerably more than the
$2000 contribution itself.98
V. TREASURY REGULATIONS99
The second generation of cross-tested plans, in which
firms structure their qualified plans to provide age-
weighted benefits to older highly compensated employees
while denying age-weighted benefits for older rank-and-file
employees impose high social costs (if we accept the notion
that qualified plans generate tax expenditures and need an
external social justification). Furthermore, those costs
would rise if the legislation under debate in Congress
becomes law. The Internal Revenue Service reacted to these
costs by issuing a Notice in February 2000, in which it
expressed concern about new comparability and other plans
in which higher benefit rates were explicitly reserved to a
few favored highly compensated employees."'
The Notice suggested that Treasury would not revisit
the permissibility of first-generation cross-tested plans, in
which all employees of similar age and service are treated
similarly, even if firm demographics imply that only a few
highly paid employees in fact benefited from the higher
accrual rates.' But the Notice evinced a preliminary view
that some of the second-generation plans impermissibly
discriminate by barring high benefit rates to employees
based on compensation rather than age. The Notice
suggested that Treasury considered some (but not all) cross-
98. The nominal tax cost is $60,000, assuming a 40% marginal tax rate. The
effective tax cost, on a present value basis, depends on interest rate
assumptions, marginal tax rates, and length of deferral. Assuming 6% interest,
a 40% marginal tax rate, and a fifteen year deferral period, the tax cost would
exceed $40,000.
99. See supra note 14.
100. I.R.S. Notice 2000-14, 2000-1 C.B. 737 (2000). The Notice indicated
that it reflected the concerns of both Treasury and the I.R.S.
101. Id. (stating that "the Service and Treasury anticipate that cross-testing
would continue to be a permissible alternative for generic age-weighted or
service-based defined contribution plans").
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tested plans discriminatory if, under the plan, older rank-
and-file employees did not benefit from the higher benefit
formulas, or if the plan adopted a formula in which other
rank-and-file employees could not "grow" into the higher
benefit structure as they aged."2
In October 2000, Treasury followed up on the Notice by
issuing proposed regulations." 3 The regulations manifest
the concerns of the Notice. From our perspective, there are
three significant aspects to the regulations.
First, the regulations do not limit the use of what we
have referred to as first-generation age-weighted plans (and
which the Notice referred to as "generic age-weighted"
plans).' Second, the regulations permit any age-weighted
defined contribution plan to be tested on a benefits basis so
long as the plan provides a minimum "gateway" allocation
to non-highly compensated employees; the allocation must
equal the lesser of 5% or one-third the highest allocation
rate among the highly compensated employees.'0 5 Finally,
the regulations permit new comparability plans so long as
each allocation rate is currently available to a group of
employees that would satisfy the § 410(b) coverage rules;
however, the regulations permit use of the non-
discriminatory classification part of the average benefits
test without regard to whether the average benefits of the
non-highly compensated employees are at least 70% of the
benefits of the highly compensated employees.0 6
102. See id. For example, some cross-tested plans, known as super-
integrated plans, base the higher allocation rates on a participant's
compensation. In such plans, a lower paid employee could never obtain the
advantage of a higher benefit formula (as a percentage of pay).
103. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(4)-8(b), 1.401(a)(4)-9(b)(2)(v), 65 Fed.
Reg. 59,774 (Oct. 6, 2000).
104. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(B)(iii), 65 Fed. Reg. at
59,778; Preamble to Proposed Regulations on Nondiscrimination Requirements
for Certain Defined Contribution Retirement Plans, 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,775.
105. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.041(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iv), 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,778.
106. See id. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iii), 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,778. The regulations
also limit the use of cross-testing for its historic purpose: when a defined benefit
and defined contribution plan are combined for purposes of § 410(b) testing.
Recall that cross-testing is necessary here if the plans are aggregated, for the
aggregation requires the comparison of benefits and contribution allocations.
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. The proposed regulations would
continue to permit this traditional use of cross-testing but only if the benefits in
the defined benefit plan are converted into comparable allocations, or if the
aggregated plans are either "primarily defined benefit in character" or are both
"broadly available" (concepts defined by the regulations). See Prop. Treas. Reg. §
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We view the regulations as a significant first step in
limiting the use of cross-testing for defined contribution
plans. In particular, the introduction of a meaningful
minimum allocation for non-highly compensated employees
is an innovative regulatory manifestation of the
nondiscrimination norm. But the regulations, by permitting
generic age-weighted plans, do not address the broader
concerns about cross-testing that we raise in this paper:
that benefit testing should be reserved to defined benefit
plans that produce meaningful shifting of the risks of
investment performance, longevity, and sudden
compensation increases to the firm and other employees. In
fairness to Treasury, this type of change, at least insofar as
it also applies to many small-firm defined benefit plans,
may require legislative attention.
At least on a symbolic level, however, the regulations do
limit some of the more egregious instances of new
comparability plans: plans where high allocation rates are
explicitly reserved for higher-paid employees, with no
possibility of lower-paid employees ever enjoying those
rates. If plans did not satisfy the minimum gateway
requirements, the regulations would deny the use of cross-
testing unless those plans covered a group of employees
that would satisfy the diluted ratio percentage
requirements of the regulation's average benefits test. 7
The regulations thus ensure a nondiscriminatory group of
employees who are either currently benefiting from age-
based allocation rates or who could, in the language of the
Preamble of the regulations, "grow into" the higher
allocation rates as the participants age or accumulate
seniority.'
The problem with this regulatory approach is that it
assumes both that the plan will survive the retirements of
the older highly compensated employees and that at least
1.401(a)(4)-9(b)(2)(v)(B), (C), 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,779. The regulations thus limit
cross-testing on a benefits basis to situations in which the proposed regulations'
other requirements for cross-testing are satisfied, or when the combination of
plans is not designed to bypass those requirements.
107. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(iii), 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,778.
We do not, however, see the logic in allowing firms to use the lower ratio
percentages of the average benefits test regulations without satisfying the
average benefits test; we would limit most employers to the 70% general ratio
percentage test.
108. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 59,775.
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some of the rank-and-file workers will continue to be
employed (and to participate in the plan) as they grow
older. In some small firms, however, the probability of these
events is quite low. Assume, for example, a small law office,
with two attorneys in their fifties and three support
employees in their twenties and thirties. It is likely that
when the attorneys retire, the firm will wind down its
business; even if the firm continues in the hands of other
attorneys, it is far from clear that the new owners will
continue the age-based plan or that the original support
employees will still be employed. Moreover, even if the
rank-and-file workers are still employed, the plan could
presumably be amended to exclude them from participation
and pass the nondiscrimination test by adding new younger
support employees to the plan. As Professor Zelinsky points
out, in the types of situations we just described, younger
rank-and-file employees will never as a practical matter
grow into the higher allocations."'
The regulations could potentially be revised to address
these types of situations by drawing upon another
requirement of qualified plans: that the firm intend the
plan to be "a permanent as distinguished from a temporary
program.""' A cross-tested plan, in our view, does not
satisfy the permanence requirement if the plan has a high
probability of termination before the rank-and-file
employees have an opportunity to enjoy higher age- and
seniority-based allocation rates.
We address three objections to this position. The first is
that the permanence requirement should not distinguish
among different varieties of plans: if an age-weighted profit-
sharing plan is not permanent because it will likely
terminate if the firm's key employees are expected to retire
within ten or so years of the plan's adoption, then a
contributions-tested profit-sharing plan should presumably
also not be permanent in such situations. We respond by
noting that the permanence requirement has, for more than
half a century, been linked to nondiscrimination concerns.
The regulations establishing the permanence requirement
provide that while a firm can reserve the right to change or
terminate the plan, a plan will be suspect under the
permanence rule "if, for example, a pension plan is
109. See Zelinsky, Is Cross-Testing A Mistake?, supra note 9, at 595-98.
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1976).
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abandoned soon after pensions have been fully funded for
persons in favor of whom discrimination is prohibited under
section 401(a)."1" This linkage of permanence and the
nondiscrimination norm should apply to cross-tested
defined contribution plans in which higher allocation rates
are, as a practical matter, reserved for a few highly paid
employees.
The second objection is a practical one: How can the
IRS administratively determine which plans are not
intended to be permanent? Some firms with older owners
will undoubtedly continue beyond the retirement of those
participants and new owners may continue the plan. Even
if such decisions are indeed too difficult to be made in
practice-which we are not persuaded is the case-
regulators could simply take the position that a cross-tested
plan is assumed to be permanent from inception. If the plan
is then terminated before rank-and-file employees grow into
their benefits, the firm could be forced to make curative
allocations for rank-and-file employees or suffer retroactive
disqualification.
The third objection is that this requirement will impose
an undue regulatory burden on the firms using a cross-
tested approach to meeting the nondiscrimination rules.
Our response is that we would prefer to prohibit cross-
testing altogether. In the absence of such an outright
prohibition, it does not seem unfair to impose a small
regulatory burden on the affected firms in order to ensure
that the substantial benefits afforded by cross-testing are
not unduly abused.
This third objection is related to a criticism of the
regulations from some critics: that the regulations will
result in many small businesses abandoning their plans
rather than complying with the new restrictions, which will
in turn harm rather than help rank-and-file employees with
whose welfare the proposed regulations are primarily
concerned."' We offer two responses to this argument.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Writers Speak Out on the Proposed Regulations on New
Comparability Plans, 90 TAx NOTES 595 (2001); Debate on Restrictions on New
Comparability Plans Continues, 87 TAx NOTES 1470 (2000); Letter from
American Society of Pension Actuaries, to I.R.S. (Jan. 5, 2001),
http://www.aspa.org/archivepages/gad2001!NewComp-CommentLetter.htm
(last visited July 7, 2001) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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First, to determine the validity of this critique, it is
necessary to weigh the adverse effects on rank-and-file
employees of likely plan terminations against the losses
such employees currently suffer because firms willing to
sponsor traditional defined contribution plans have shifted
to an age- or seniority-weighted, or new comparability,
format. Until such a study has been undertaken, we regard
the underlying argument simply as an assertion without
any clear empirical backing."'
Second, this type of criticism of the proposed
regulations raises a more fundamental question: whether
the considerable tax cost of new comparability plans can be
justified by the almost trivial level of benefits provided to
many rank-and-file employees. There are certainly less
costly ways of assisting rank-and-file workers to save for
retirement than dangling extravagant tax benefits to the
owners of small firms to set up plans in which most rank-
and-file workers receive contributions equal to 3% of their
113. The American Society of Pension Actuaries (ASPA) has conducted a
study, but it does not answer the questions we posed. See ASPA Survey, supra
note 73. The study does say that 50% of small firms that currently sponsor new
comparability plans would decline qualified plan sponsorship if they had to test
their plans on a contributions basis, id., but this means that another 50% of
small employers (and presumably a larger percentage of other employers) would
continue sponsoring plans-plans that might provide better coverage for rank-
and-file employees. The ASPA study also indicates that 49% of new
comparability plans provide contributions equal to at least 5% of pay, but the
number apparently is based on the pay of all employees rather than just rank-
and-file employees. See id.
The ASPA survey, the instrument for which is archived on the ASPA Web
site, see American Society of Pension Actuaries, New Comparability Plan
Survey (2000), at http://www.aspa.org/archivepages/gac2000/gacsurvey.htm
(last visited April 27, 2001) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review), has some
methodological shortcomings. The survey was conducted via the internet, with
questions to be completed by actuaries. See id. The actuaries were asked how
many plans they represented and then were asked to make subjective
judgments as to how many plans would be terminated rather than redesigned if
new comparability were no longer permitted. Id. We note that the response to
this question was the judgment of the actuary about what a plan sponsor would
do. Aside from the problems inherent in casually surveying a group of
consultants about what their clients might hypothetically do, the question did
not ask what would happen if the proposed regulations were adopted; rather,
the question asked what would happen if new comparability plans were no
longer available. See id. However, the regulations would not end new
comparability plans, but instead would place some restrictions on their use. The
ASPA summary of the responses to the survey, see ASPA Survey, supra note 73,
also ignores answers to some survey questions, which suggests the possibility
that those responses might not have fully supported ASPA's policy positions.
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compensation. Indeed, it might be far less expensive to give
workers a matching credit for their contributions to IRAs.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF NONDISCRIMINATION
STANDARDS
Professor Zelinsky suggests that cross-testing exposes
an insoluble incoherence in the nondiscrimination norm, at
least for small firms: whether a plan is discriminatory often
turns on the form by which qualified plan accumulations
are measured, as contributions or benefits. Rules barring or
limiting cross-testing, furthermore, cannot introduce
coherence to the norm, since firms ultimately have access to
both defined contribution and defined benefit plans. Firms
will, Professor Zelinsky observes, continue to be able to test
on a benefits basis by adopting a defined benefit plan.
This argument overstates the level of incoherence in the
current rules, since a decision to adopt a defined benefit
plan is not equivalent to the adoption of a defined
contribution plan. Employees generally derive no risk-
shifting from the adoption of a defined contribution plan,
may find that the employer can choose to provide no
benefits in particular years, and do not have a benefit
guaranty from a government agency (the PBGC)."'
Moreover, the putative incoherence can be resolved either
by limiting the availability of defined benefit plans to
situations in which meaningful risk-shifting is likely to
occur, or by imposing a more rigorous "permanence"
requirement for both defined benefit and cross-tested
defined contribution plans.
We do not, however, overestimate the political will to
effect such changes and thus find ourselves in practical
agreement with Professor Zelinsky's assessment that the
nondiscrimination rules-at least with respect to small
firms-lack substance. Moreover, cross-testing is not the
only reason that the nondiscrimination rules lack
substance. Earlier in the article, we alluded to some of the
other strategies that a firm might harness in order to create
a substantial degree of discrimination in favor of highly-
compensated employees, including limiting coverage,
requiring vesting service, integrating benefits with Social
114. See supra note 72.
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Security, and crediting past service credits.'15 Thus, we
doubt the efficacy of today's nondiscrimination rules in
many small business settings to produce meaningful
retirement savings for rank-and-file employees who
participate in such plans.
It is here, however, that we part company with
Professor Zelinsky. He does not believe that the tax
treatment of qualified plans, which produces substantial
tax savings for people who are able to defer compensation
into such plans, should be characterized as tax
expenditures requiring some social or economic justification
extrinsic to the purposes of an income tax."6 We are among
those people who subscribe to the opposite view, which
Professor Zelinsky in an understatement labels
conventional wisdom:'17 that the tax regime for qualified
plans varies from the normative features of an income tax
and thus can be justified only as a tax expenditure. Thus,
unlike Professor Zelinsky, we would not abandon the goal of
using regulation to promote the share of the aggregate tax
expenditure enjoyed by, and the retirement savings
undertaken by, rank-and-file workers. Indeed, in our view,
societal willingness to continue to maintain the special tax
treatment for qualified plan savings should hinge on our
ability to improve the operation of the nondiscrimination
rules.
Professor Zelinsky argues that his conclusions about
the ineffectiveness of the nondiscrimination rules contain a
lesson for those "favoring a more paternalistic pension
policy" than he favors."'
For those troubled by the outright abolition of the
nondiscrimination norm, but skeptical of introducing more
complexity to the qualified plan regime, a viable alternative to the
status quo is to replace the nondiscrimination norm with
straightforward minima, for example, any defined contribution
plan must provide each participant with a contribution of at least
3% annually....119
115. See supra Part II.B.
116. Zelinsky, Is Cross Testing a Mistake?, supra note 9, at 595.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 626.
119. Id.
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Here, we agree with Professor Zelinsky, although with
some reluctance, and offer a variation on his proposal that
we think holds somewhat more promise for increasing the
retirement security of rank-and-file workers.
Under current law, the basic conceptual model for the
nondiscrimination norm is one of proportionality: highly
compensated and rank-and-file employees receive the same
level of benefits as a percentage of pay. Firms often go to
great lengths to design their plans to escape this
proportionality model, i.e., to provide a higher benefit level
to highly compensated employees, because they believe that
higher paid employees place more value on tax-deferred
savings than rank-and-file employees, and that the optimal
level of deferred compensation is much lower for the latter
than the former.
The current regime does not reflect a meaningful
proportionality requirement for most small firms, however.
Cross-testing defined contribution plans is only the most
recent, and often most dramatic, available tool to avoid
proportionality. And we agree with Professor Zelinsky that
attempts to ensure a significant measure of proportionality
through new legislation will not find sufficient
Congressional support. Even if they did, such gains would
likely be short-lived. Ultimately, given the resourceful
creativity of the pension consulting industry, new
legislation of this sort would succeed only in bringing
further complexity to the qualified plan area.
A minimum contribution regime, however, might
command relatively broad political support as a legislative
initiative, since it would relieve many firms of the planning
and operational costs they pay today to avoid proportionate
benefit levels for all employees. In exchange for this relief,
firms would agree to provide minimum contribution levels
for all employees. The size of such minimum contribution,
although ultimately a matter of primarily political
dimension, should be sufficient to justify the substantial tax
expenditure that qualified plans impose. We would like to
see an annual contribution set in a range of 5-10%, which
seems reasonable given the under-saving of many baby
boomers (the oldest of whom are now in their early fifties)
and the likelihood of increased longevity for today's younger
workers.
Unlike Professor Zelinsky, though, we would structure
the minimum contribution differently, particularly if the
6712001]
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minimum contribution were not in the range we support.
Rather than a straight contribution requirement, as
Professor Zelinsky suggests, 120  we would structure a
contribution requirement as a reverse match for an elective
deferral arrangement, under which the maximum elective
deferrals would be a multiple of the employer
contribution. 12' For example, the requirement might be that
elective deferrals could be up to three times the firm's direct
contributions. Thus, if the firm contributed 5% for each
employee, any employee could make an elective deferral of
up to 15% of compensation.
This approach has three advantages over a bare
minimum contribution requirement. First, it locks no
employee into a fixed level of qualified plan savings;
individual rank-and-file employees could, as they now have
the option to do through § 401(k) plans, save at the same
rate as highly paid employees if they choose. Second, it
retains a version of the proportional benefits model that in
theory informs the current regulatory regime; the model
ties the social benefit of a particular qualified plan'22 in at
least an approximate way to the size of the tax
expenditures generated by that qualified plan. Third, to the
extent the minimum contribution level is set higher than
rank-and-file employees currently desire to save on their
own, it provides incentives for the employer to educate
120. Id.
121. This idea is not original. A proposal that might be seen as its
intellectual forebear was included in the 1989 report of the New York State Bar
Association Special Committee on Pension Simplification, chaired by Alvin
Lurie. The Committee proposed a plan in which employers would be required to
make a base contribution for all employees, who could then make additional
contributions. See New York State Bar Ass'n Special Comm. on Pension
Simplification, A Process Awry: Call for Simplification and Rationalization of
the Federal Pension Laws, reprinted in 8 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 75, 100-101 (1989).
The idea of an explicit reserve match was proposed in 1997 by Senators Jeff
Bingaman and James Jeffords. Their Pension ProSave Act, S. 957, 105th Cong.
(1997), incorporated a proposal for a plan in which the employer would make an
initial contribution of at least 1% of salary for each eligible employee. Id. § 101.
Employees could then match the employer contribution by a two-to-one ratio.
Id. The proposal had a $6000 annual dollar limit. Id.
122. We would define the social benefit as the amount of retirement savings
generated for middle and lower-income workers, who presumably are the
intended beneficiaries of a paternalistic government policy to encourage
savings. More affluent individuals have greater capacity to save and are less
compelling candidates for government incentives to save for retirement.
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employees about the value of saving for retirement through
qualified plans.
The value of education in promoting retirement savings
is worthy of further examination. Some supporters of new
comparability plans, for example, argue that a minimum
allocation of 5% of pay for rank-and-file employees would be
welfare-reducing for such workers. In other words, rank-
and-file employees would not be willing to accept a dollar-
for-dollar reduction in cash compensation for contributions
to a qualified plan amounting to 5% of pay. We assume that
this is, in fact, currently the case in many situations."
Some recent economic work, however, suggests that the
resistance of rank-and-file employees to qualified plan
savings can be attenuated through employer initiatives,
including education.24  To the extent that legal
requirements condition the provision of desired deferral
levels for proprietary employees on the provision of similar
deferral levels for other employees, they provide an
important incentive for employers to educate employees and
adopt plan design features that encourage increased levels
of retirement savings. Moving from a proportionality
nondiscrimination regime to a minimum contribution
regime may, at the margin, undermine employer incentive
to modify employee savings behavior by providing such
education. Our proposal retains some incentive for firms to
provide financial education to rank-and-file workers. Our
proposal would also introduce considerable flexibility to the
regulatory regime governing qualified plans, since
integration and vesting rules could be dispensed with
entirely.
123. One caveat is worth noting. The costs of non-wage compensation, such
as pensions, will generally be reflected in wage compensation; but it is unclear
whether such shifting occurs at the level of the individual worker, as opposed to
large groups of workers or the firm's workforce as a whole. See, e.g., Jonathan
Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS (A. J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
124. See generally PATRICK J. BAYER ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL
EDUCATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5655, 1996), available at
http//papers.nber.org/papers/w5655.pdf; B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & DANIEL M.
GARRETT, THE DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN
THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5667, 1996), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w5667.pdf.
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We are not certain that a satisfactory version of this
proposal should (and perhaps even could) be developed for
defined benefit plans (except perhaps for cash balance
plans). Defined benefit plans that provide for meaningful
risk-shifting and that satisfy a meaningful permanence test
are not troubling, at least from the policy perspective from
which we have written this paper. Defined benefit plans
that are temporal or fail to shift risk, however, should
either be denied the tax benefits of the qualified plan
regime or subjected to a minimum accrual requirement. If
the latter approach were taken, plan benefits should be
indexed to cost-of-living increases, including increases after
an employee ceases to be covered by the plan. If not, such
plans could continue to be used as devices to discriminate
against younger rank-and-file employees, which ultimately
is the core of the cross-testing controversy: introducing into
defined contribution plans a problem previously confined to
certain (but not all) defined benefit and target benefit
plans.
CONCLUSION
The Treasury Department's proposed regulations
limiting the use of cross-testing are a useful first step in
curtailing the most egregious cases in which the basic
intent of the nondiscrimination norm is violated. A similar
case could be made for limiting the use of defined benefit
plans in small firms, since a defined benefit format in such
a setting often does not accomplish much of the risk-sharing
inherent to larger defined benefit plans. Defined benefit
plans in small firms often share many of the costs
associated with cross-tested defined contribution plans, and
lack the offsetting benefits of defined benefit plans in larger
firms. Finally, we propose a broader reform of the
nondiscrimination rules that would reduce complexity while
remaining consistent with the fundamental goal of using
the tax expenditures associated with qualified plans to
promote retirement saving among lower- and middle-
income workers.
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